Economic and Financial Review
Volume 29

Number 2

Article 4

6-1-1991

Appraisal of recent exchange rate policy measures in Nigeria.
E.U. Olisadebe

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.cbn.gov.ng/efr

Recommended Citation
Olisadebe, E. U. (1991). Appraisal of recent exchange rate policy measures in Nigeria. CBN Economic and
Financial Review, 29(2), 156â€“185.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CBN Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economic and Financial Review by an authorized editor of CBN Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact dc@cbn.gov.ng.

OUSADEBE

156

APPRAISAL OF RECENf EXCHANGE RATE
POLICY MEASURES IN NIGERIA
E. U. OLISADEBE•

The Nigenan economy was vtslbly distressed. prior to the introduction of the ongoing economtc reform
programme. External reserves were relatively low. 'The accwnulation of payments arrears pushed the
country's debt stock to unconifortable Level These tended to completely erode the country's internattonal
credit worthiness thereby constraining its accessibility to internat'.onal credit. Real output decUned. and
level of unemployment rematned. high. The natra exchange rate was grossly overoalued. with adverse
consequences for the balance of payments. A comprehensive macro-economic reform programme - the
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) - was therefore introduced in 1986 to eltmtnate the observed
distortions in the economy and to predispose it to sustainable growth. A major strategy tn the reform
process is the determtnatton of a realistic naira exchange rate through the operation of market forces.
The new approach contrasted. sharply wtth the previous system where the natra exchange rate was
administrattvely .fixed. and remained. relatively rigtd. The Second·tter Foreign Exchange Market (SF'EM),
an institutional and auction-based.frameworkfor achieving a realistic natra exchange rate has since its
inception in 1986, been oonttnuaUy .ftne-tuned. to enhance its effeiency. The new exchange rate poUcy
was designed. to achteve Internal and external balance and improve the effeiency of resource allocatton.
Specifically, tt was atmed at loosening the stranglehold. qf oil on the economy, reduce the dependence on
tmports, tncrease non·otl exports, eUminate payments arrears and overoaluation of the natra exchange
rate. The impact of the new exchange rate policy on the economy has been mixed. On the one hand. real
output increased in the pertod 1986-1990 contrasting with the developments tn the preceding jwe
years. The external balance was maintained.. The contribution of non-oil to total exports increased.. Trade
and payments arrears were eliminated. 'The proportion of repatriated. earnings as well as the level of
autonomously .ftnanced. tmports increased tn 1989 and 1990. The List of non-oil exports has increased to
include non-tradttional exports such as rurs, charcoal and petroleum products. The high parallel market
premium has been drastu:ally reduced. However, grey areas remain. The parallel market prem1um has
widened tn recent months. The pressure on the natra exchange rate has persisted, capactty ultlization in
the industrial sector remained. at its nadir reflecting high cost of credit and the depredation of the natra
exchange rate. To ensure the stability of the naira exchange rate, the Level of .fiscal deflcit should be
drastically reduced so as to reduce the excess liqutdity in the system. The interest rate should be
deregulated.. This will enhance capital trJj1ow and reduce the abiUty of speculators to finance their
operations. Efforts should be lntens!fted at improving the domestic supply situation so as to dampen
inflationary pressures. To reduce speculation against the currency, the supply of foreign exchange
should be improved thrOt.19h a more aggresstve export policy by the private sector and more
comprehensive resched.uUng of the country's external debt.

Prior to the introduction of the ongoing economic reform programme in 1986,
the Nigerian economy was in a highly traumatised state. The sharp fall in oil price
and the consequent decline in foreign exchange receipts were such that the
economy could not meet its international financial commitments. However,
imports of goods and seIVices could not be scaled down immediately as there was
a strong perception then that the cash-flow problem was temporary. Consequently, unpaid trade bills and payments arrears accumulated. This, along with
the precarious external reserves position severely compromised Nigeria's credit
worthiness abroad to the extent that. for some time, access to international credit
was constrained. Efforts were, however, made to tackle some of these problems.
These were embodied in the economic stabilization measures of 1982. With respect
to exchange rate policy which is the focus of this paper, an accelerated depreciation of the naira exchange rate was commenced. However, the overvaluatlon of the
• The views expressed fn this paper are those of the author; they do not represent thoee of the Central Bank of
Nigeria. The author la Deputy Director In The Bank's Research Department.
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exchange rate persisted as the ratecontinued to be fixed administratively. By and
large, the exchange rate policy in force then lacked dynamism and proper
articulation. The result was that the rate remained grossly overvalued and was
propped up by stringent trade and exchange control system. As foreign exchange
was not made readily available to all users at the prevalent low official price, the
parallel market blossomed. The parallel market premium - an indication of the
misalignment of the exchange rate - was about two hundred per cent during the
two years preceding the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP) in 1986. The overvaluation of the naira exchange rate had deleterious effects
on the economy. It cheapened imports and stunted the growth of non-oil exports
with adverse consequences for the balance of payments. On the domestic front, the
severe reduction in foreign exchange receipts made it extremely difficult for a
largely import-dependent industrial sector to sustain its output. The result was
severe underutilization of capacity coupled with high rate of unemployment.
Inflationary pressures also persisted largely as a result of financing of huge fiscal
deficit.
At the end of 1985, therefore, the economy was on the brink of collapse. It thus
became clear that what was needed was a comprehensive macro-economic reform
programme that would address the structural imbalances in the economy. The
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was therefore introduced in 1986 to
chart a new course in macro-economic management. The major objectives of the
Programme include restructuring and diversifying of the production base of the
economy, achieving durable fiscal and balance of payments viability, among
others. Some of the major strategies designed to achieve the above policy objectives
include restructuring of tariff to protect industry and agriculture, removal of
elements of subsidy on goods and services provided by the public sector. Of major
strategic importance in the nexus of policy were the maintenance of a viable and
realistic naira exchange rate, and the liberalization of trade and payments system.
At the inception of the SAP. the vision of the economy that the authorities had in
mind was a highly deregulated one where market forces would be increasingly
relied upon to direct economic activities.
The institutional framework for achieving a realistic naira exchange rate was
initially the Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) which is an auctionbased market. The SFEM has undergone several changes although the basic
objectives of the new exchange rate regime remained the same. In recent times,
however, many people have begun to question the efficiency of the new policy
thrust because of the persistent depreciation of the naira exchange rate, the
persistent wide divergence between official and parallel market rates, the slow
response of non-oil exports to the new policy regime, the slow pace of export
diversification and the low level of direct foreign investment. These have called into
question, the appropriateness of the modalities of the current exchange rate
policy. In response to these criticisms and conscious of the key role which the
exchange rate plays in the economy, the naira exchange rate has been kept under
constant surveillance by the authorities who have continued to seek ways of
ensuring that a realistic rate is achieved.
It is the purpose of this paper, therefore, to review and appraise the exchange
rate policy measures, especially the most recent ones. To place the analysis in its
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proper perspective, the paper is divided into five sections. Section I articulates the
conceptual and theoretical framework and contains a review of current naira
exchange rate policy. Section II outlines the policy measures undertaken so far
while the appraisal of the policy measures is attempted in Section III. Section IV
suggests measures that would ensure a viable and stable naira exchange rate. The
last section contains the summary and conclusions.

SECTION I
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

'-In the literature, many factors are usually specified as influencing the real
exchange rate. These include, differentials in inflation rate, interest rate, growth
in national income between one country and another as well as the incidence of
speculation. The factors are integrated into exchange rate models. Some of these
models including the traditional flow model, monetary model and the portfoliobalance model are reviewed briefly as follows:
The Traditional Flow Model

According to this model. the exchange rate is determined simply by the forces
of supply and demand for foreign exchange. The exchange rate is in equilibrium
when supply equals demand. The current account imbalance is offset by a net flow
of capital in the opposite direction. A current account surplus is financed by
acquisition of financial assets abroad or outflow of capital. Similarly, a deficit is
financed by an inflow of capital. The current account is assumed to be determined
by changes in relative prices and real income. Increases in domestic prices relative
to foreign prices lead to exchange rate depreciation. This is because increases in the
domestic price level feed into costs thereby making exports costly and highly
uncompetitive. Consequently, the supply of foreign exchange is constrained.
Imports on the other hand, increase since the inflation ridden economy is a more
profitable place to export to. If imports are very inelastic, import payments increase
thereby increasing the demand for foreign exchange. Under this model, increases
in real income cause exchange rate to depreciate because such increases tend to
increase demand for imports with negative impact on the current account but with
no offsetting increase in capital inflow. The model posits that an increase in
domestic interest rate relative to the foreign interest rate causes an appreciation
of the exchange rate through induced capital inflow. The model prescribes that a
country that intends to strengthen its exchange must therefore raise interest rate,
lower prices and reduce real growth. An important drawback of this approach is
that it ignores the relevance of the asset market. The model prescribes that a
country can continue to run a current account deficit indefinitely and merely
finance such deficit through capital inflow into the deficit country induced by
higher interest rates. The model therefore assumes that foreigners will accumulate
the deficit country's domestic assets indefinitely. In such a situation the stability
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condition for financial asset accumulation by foreigners is neither ~stablished nor
feasible. The defect of the traditional flow model is partially remedied under the
monetary model.
Monetary Model

Broadly, the monetary model tries to explain changes in exchange rates in terms
of changes in the demand for and supply of money between two countries.
According to this model. an increase in money supply causes the exchange rate to
depreciate as a result of inflationary pressures so generated. An increase in real
income, with a fixed nominal money supply, causes prices to fall leading to an
appreciation of the exchange rate. An increase in domestic interest rate lowers
money demand, raises prices (with a given stock of money). The increase in prices
leads to the depreciation of the exchange rate. It can be seen from the above, that
although the traditional flow and monetary models specify the same factors as
affecting the exchange rate, the results are in the opposite directions. The former
predicts that increase in real income and interest rate lead to exchange rate
appreciation. However, they cause the exchange rate to depreciate in the latter.
One of the criticisms of the monetary model is the assumption that domestic and
foreign bonds are perfect substitutes. I(the two assets are not perfect substitutes,
then account must be taken of the differences in their prices and yields. The
problem is addressed by the portfolio balance or asset-disturbance model.
Porifolio-Balance Model

The portfolio-balance model assumes that residents distribute their wealth
among three fonns of assets: monetary base, domestic bonds and foreign bonds.
The exchange rate is in equilibrium when the holdings of these assets are in their
desired proportion. An increase in domestic wealth may arise either from increases
in monetary base, holdings of government bonds or from the current account
surplus. An increase in wealth increases the demand for foreign bonds or assets
leading to a depreciation of the exchange rate as a result of capital outflow so
generated. However, an increase in private sector holdings of government bonds
(increase in domestic government debt) drives bond prices down and raises
interest rate. This causes an appreciation of the exchange rate. Thus, an increase
in domestic government bonds has an uncertain effect on the exchange rate. The
exchange rate may appreciate or depreciate, depending on the relative strengths
of the substitution and income effects. The exchange rate will appreciate if the
substitution effect is stronger. On the other hand, it will depreciate if it is weaker
than the income effect. A major criticism of the asset-disturbance model is that it
ignores the fundamental determinants of trade, role of expectations as well as the
role of purchasing power parity.
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Theory

The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory attempts. to explain the equilibrium
value of the exchange rate in terms of inflationary differential between two
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countries. The theory assumes that exchange rate of currencies of two countries
move in a manner that seeks to offset the inflation differential between the
economies thereby maintaining the real purchasing power of either currency in the
other economy. There are two variants of this doctrine, the absolute and the
relative versions. The absolute version states that the equilibrium exchange rate
between domestic and foreign currencies is equal to the ratio of domestic to foreign
prices. The relative version states that changes in the equilibrium exchange
reflects changes in domestic and foreign prices. The absolute and the relative
versions are defined thus:

pppA

pppR

(1)

=

(2)

p•

Where

pt
p•

pppA

=

t

current price level in domestic economy
current price level in foreign country

t

=

current absolute PPP (exchange rate measured)
)
(as units of foreign
)
(currency per unit of
)
(domestic currency

pppR

=

current relative PPP

Eo

=

nominal exchange rate in base period.

Given the basic assumptions that the shortrun PPP tends towards the
longrun PPP and that the PPP is the longrun equilibrium exchange rate, then
V

=
X

Where V =

magnitude of overvaluation where
(+)
indicates overvaluation
(- ) " undervaluation

100
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=

nominal official exchange rate in current perio,d

=

equilibrium exchange rate

The concept of the PPP has been one of the most useful building blocks in
exchange rate determination as well as in policy formulation especially in flexible
exchange regimes. Since the PPP theory was first propounded in the 1920s by
Gustav Cassell, economists have continued to debate whether the PPP holds in the
short-run, long-run or not at all. In the 1920's during the brief period of floating
rP.gimes, estimates validated the PPP hypotheses that the elasticity of exchange
rate with respect to the price ratio was about unity. However in the l 970's, shortrun changes in exchange rate did not reflect changes in price differentials. The
debate has therefore shifted to whether the PPP holds in the long-run. A major
problem in determining the validity oflong-run PPP is the concept of the long-run
itself. Empirical results on the validity oflong-run PPP have been mixed. Although
Frankel could confirm the validity of the PPP hypothesis in the 1920's, he could
not do so in the 1970's. However, Lothian (1989), using data covering over 100
years for Japan, US, UK and France found that the real exchange rate tended to
return to its long-run equilibrium. Thus the determination of the empirical validity
of the constancy of the long-run equilibrium PPP continues.
The dismal performance of the PPP hypothesis in the short-run is due to a
number of factors whose consideration may help to explain the deviation of current
exchange rate from its equilibrium. Flrst, the equilibrium value of the exchange
rate is influenced by the choice of the base year, structural shift in the economy
and changes in relative prices, the proportion of traded to non-traded goods in the
price index as well as by inflationary expectations and speculation. Indeed some
economists have postulated that the deviation from equilibrium may reflect the
size of speculation. Also, national prices do not strongly correlate with asset prices
.such as exchange rate and stock market prices. This is because commodity prices
are "sticky" reflecting, for example, finite nominal contracts. Exchange rates, on
the other hand, being the price of durable asset (money) reflect changes in
expectations which are in turn influenced by current even ts. These events include
uncertainty about future course of economic and political events which induce
sharp changes in expectation. The fact that these events cannot be predicted
implies that exchange rate movements assume the nature of"random walk". If this
is so, then the long-run PPP does not hold. Studies by Adler, Lehmann etc. rejected
the notion of long-run PPP. However, Lothians (1989) using data covering over 100
years, found that real exchange rates tended to return to their long-run
equilibrium values. Under these circumstances of conflicting results. policy
makers must look more closely at factors that cause the exchange rate to deviate
from its long-run equilibrium value.
Despite its deficiencies, the PPP has been used in this analysis as one of the
criteria for evaluating the current naira exchange .rate policy in Nigeria because of
its simplicity and operational tractability. The results of the PPP calculations are
contained in Table 4.
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Equilibrium Exchange Rate
As has been noted elsewhere, exchange rate adjustment (ERA) is undertaken to
achieve certain macro and micro-economic objectives. These objectives include
the achievement of balance of payments viability, the maintenance of internal
balance and the promotion of efficiency in resources allocation. Therefore, an
equilibrium exchange rate may be defined as that real rate which promotes the
achievement of external balance in a manner that is consistent with the other
targets of economic policy. In this context. equilibrium exchange rate is synonymous with an appropriate or realistic rate. However, it should be distinguished
from the nominal rate which clears the foreign exchange market at the auction
session. This is because equilibrium in the foreign exchange market does not
ensure that the goods and money markets are in equilibrium. Thus equilibrium in
the foreign exchange market could be sub-optimal in the sense that full employment of resources might not be guaranteed.
Real/Nominal Exchange Rate

The nominal exchange rate is the exchange rate as generally understood and
quoted. Simply, it is the price of one currency in terms of another. It can be quoted
as so many units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency or conversely.
In Nigeria, it is commonly quoted as so many units of Naira per unit of foreign
currency (Naira per dollar for example). In the United Kingdom (UK) it is quoted as
so many units of foreign currency per unit of pound Sterling. The concept of
nominal exchange rate is important in many respects. It determines the cost of
imports to importers and the level of revenue to exporters. For policy purposes, it
can be used as a variable to compensate for movements in differential rates of
inflation.
Real Exchange Rate

However, in measuring a country's price competitiveness, the real exchange
rate is employed. This is defined as the nominal exchange rate deflated by the index
of relative inflation rates.
By definition,
RER
=
Et . p• t
(P*)

E/ [(P)J

~

Where

RER
Et
Pt
P* t

=

=
=

=

Real exchange rate
Nominal exchange rate in current period
Price of domestic tradeable good in current period
Price of foreign tradeable good in current period.

In practice, the Consumer Price Index (C.P.I.) is used as proxy so that the
international price competitiveness is measured as relative movements in C.P.I.
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measured in the common currency. In countries where statisttcal coverage and
sophistication are high, the wholesale price index (WPI) (which usually has a high
proportion of tradeables), domestic and foreign unit labour costs deflated by a
common currency, are used. In most developing countries, including Nigeria, the
CPI is used as proxy as a result of lack of other price indices. It is thus clear that
the real exchange rate and a country's international competitiveness are affected
by the nominal exchange rate and the cost/price relationship.

'

Real Effective Exchange Rate (REERJ

The real effective exchange rate (REER) is a trade-weighted average of real
exchange rate between one country and its trading partners. The weights reflect
the proportion of trade with a country's trading partner. The weight could be
import or export biased or a combination of the two.
REER

trade-weighted RER

Where
i =l
weights, either imports or exports or sum of
imports and exports.

Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER)

The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is the weighted average of nominal
exchange rates between one country and its trading partners. The NEER and
REER of the Naira used in this review were obtained from International Financial
Statistics, a publication of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For policy
makers, exchange rate policy in practice, requires the adjustment of the nominal
rate to achieve a REER equilibrium. While this is possible in the short-run, it is
debatable if the long-run equilibrium value of the real exchange rate can be
properly targetted given the fact that the long-run equilibrium value may not be
stable.
Objectives of Exchange Rate Policy in Nigeria

The objectives of exchange rate policy are generally the same as those of
economic policy, viz increase in output and its optimal distribution. These may be
termed the ultimate objectives. The proximate objectives, defined as those that
can be more directly influenced by exchange rate policy include the achievement
of internal and external balance as well as increasing the efficiency of resource
allocation. The objectives need further elucidation since it is against these that
exchange rate policies can be appraised. External balance does not imply that the
current account must be balanced at every turn. In fact. it may be desirable and
feasible to deliberately unbalance the account and allow capital inflow. So, the

OUSADEBE

164

attainment of external balance implies the achievement of a sustainable current
account deficit, that is, a current account deficit financed in the short-to-medium
term by a realistic inflow of capital. This qualification ls necessary since it is
neither desirable nor feasible to run current account deficit in the longer term.
Internal balance implies the achievement of high level of employment consistent
with a tolerable rate of inflation. Here, the trade-off between inflation and the level
of employment should be carefully evaluated since a consistently high pressure
on demand may increase employment but at a cost of higher rate of inflation.
Efficiency of resource allocation implies that resources move to areas where their
impact on real output will be greatest. Implicit in efficient resource allocation is the
need to realign relative prices so as to remove distortions which inhibit growth.
In Nigeria, the specific objectives of exchange rate policy include:
(i)

the achievement of balance of payments viability in the medium
term:

(II)

reduction of dependence on imports and oil exports:

(ill)

diversification of the export base;

(iv)

reduction or elimination of incidence of capital flight:

(v)

elimination of payments arrears;

(vi)

encouraging local production of inputs;

(vii)

correction of the over-valuation of the naira exchange rate through
the achievement of a realistic rate, and

(viii)

reducing or eliminating the parallel market premium thereby improving
resource allocation and enlarging the scope of legitimate foreign
exchangt- transactions.

A necessary condition for the achievement of the above objectives ls that the
exchange rate should be as stable as possible. Stability in this instance does not
imply that the rate should be static. Stability should be interpreted to permit
variability of the rate in response to changes in economic fundamentals which may
alter the equilibrium rate. Economic fundamentals include changes in relative
prices, international terms of trade and other factors that impinge directly on the
price competitiveness of the domestic economic agents and products. Stability of
the exchange rate ensures that economic agents can plan ahead without fear of
escalating costs while at the same time, unit costs can stabilize and even decline.
Also, because stability could have positive impact on inflationary expectations, it
enhances the usefulness of money and the credibility of the currency. The objective
of reducing the parallel market premium has become important in the Nigerian
situation given the existence of that market alongside the official-legal markets.
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Since these markets are somehow linked in a way. divergence of one rate from
another implies that resources are not rationally priced or employed efficiently.
Thus, a high parallel market premium is a clear indication of the extent of
misalignment of the exchange rate. The point is not that the differential should be
zero but that it should be as small as possible reflecting only transaction costs and
not speculative bubbles. However, while it is impossible to ignore the rates ruling
in the parallel market, undue obsession with that market might amount to chasing
the shadows because the market is estimated to comprise only a small segment of
the entire foreign exchange market. The market, having operated for a long period
of time, has become deeply entrenched. In any case, with the operations of the
Bureaux de Change being more effectively felt and further liberalization of the
trade and payments system, the importance of the parallel market may be
considerably reduced. Being a residual market. it will tend to survive unless the
problem of large excess demand for foreign exchange in the economy can be
contained. It may be noted here also that the survival of the market has been
facilitated by leakages from the official market. Consequently, the goal should be
to ensure that the parallel market premium declines and probably disappears over
the long-term.

SECTION II
RECENT EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY MEASURES

In this section, attempts will be made to discuss the policy measures taken since
the commencement of SAP in 1986. However, the review will focus largely on the
most recent ones, that is, those measures starting with the introduction of the
interbank foreign exchange market (IFEM) in 1989. While the basic framework for
operating the exchange rate policy remains unchanged, the modalities have been
continuously fine-tuned through various changes in operating rules and complementary measures in monetary and fiscal policies. These were also geared
towards achieving the desired objectives stated earlier.
The Dual Exchange Rate Regime

The naira was floated on the 26th of September, 1986 in what was referred to
as the Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM). The second-tier exchange
rate applied to all transactions except debt service payments. embassy expenses,
subscriptions to international organisations and settlement of transitional or preSFEM transactions. The first-tier exchange rate, was applicable to all excluded
transactions. The authorised dealers were required to bid for foreign exchange
subject to their allocation ceilings and at prices that appeared to them to
approximate the market perception of demand for and supply of foreign exchange.
To ensure equity, banks were categorized into two, namely. big and small. Big
banks could purchase a maximum of 10 per cent. while small ones purchased a
maximum of 7 per cent. Under this arrangement. many banks did not win at the
auctions. To increase the number of successful winners. the banks were classified
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into big, medium and small With each category entitled to 5, 2 and 1.5 per cent,
respectively. During the first two auctions in the second-tier foreign exchange
market (SFEM}, the exchange rate was determined by averaging the successful bid
rates. After the first two biddings. the average rate method was replaced With the
marginal rate pricing which had the potential ofreduclng the obsetved continuous
depreciation of the currency. To introduce more professionalism into the system
of bidding that is, ensure that bids reflect economic fundamentals, the Dutch
Auction System (DAS) was put in place In April, 1987. Under the system, dealers
were allocated funds at their bid rates. The objective was to reduce the propensity
for high bids. The effect was a multiplicity of bid rates. However, the official
exchange rate was determined at the margin. In addition, the bidding period was
changed from once a week to once in a fortnight.
Later in July 1987, the dual exchange rate system was abolished with the
merger of both the first and second-tier rates. All transactions. thenceforth. were
to be priced at the second-tier rates. This was to eliminate the subsidy on firsttier transactions, rationalise the allocation of foreign exchange and eliminate
multiple currency practices. However, transitional transactions continued to be
excluded from this arrangement. The autonomous foreign exchange market
blossomed in 1988. Under this arrangement foreign exchange acquired by the
banks on their own initiative could be sold by them at rates determined also by
them, subject however, to a maximum spread ofone per cent. The objective was
to encourage non-oil foreign exchange inflow to banks and thereby relieve the
pressure on the official market. The autonomous market was abolished in
January, 1989 as a result of distortions it induced in the system as well as its
inability to foster the stability of the naira exchange rate in the official market.
The Inter-Bank Foreign Exchange Market

The inter-bank foreign exchange market thus came into operation in January,
1989. The objective of this measure was to unify the rates in the official and
autonomous segments ofthe market so as to reduce distortions inherent in the old
system. The operations were conducted on a daily basis. The exchange rate was
determined by using one or a combination of the following:(I)

Weighted average of all quotations submitted by banks; (individual bank"s
quotations weighted by amount demanded.)

(ii)

Simple average of all quotations submitted by banks;

(iii) Highest and lowest banks' quotations provided the latter does not depre-

ciate by more than 2 per cent when compared with the rate that emerges
in (ii) above; and
(iv) Intelligence reports on exchange rate movements during the previous day
both in inter-bank market and in some world .financial centres.
For purposes of determining the amount of foreign exchange that should be
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allocated to each bank. all dealing banks were classified into {our groups and
ranked from biggest to smallest. The classification was based on the weighted
average of a number of factors which included the banks' levels of net assets, net
profit, loans and advances, and deposit liabilities. The proportion oftotal allocations
that went to each group and bank was not immutable but changed to reflect the
number of new banks that came into the market for the first time as well as the
amount of foreign exchange the Central Bank was prepared to put into the market.
In determining the amount to be allocated to banks generally, the Central Bank
took into account the level and stability of foreign exchange inflow as well as the
stock of contingent liabilities of the monetary authorities.
Another practice in the operation of the market was that dealers bought foreign
exchange on their own account Instead of on behalf of their customers as was the
case previously. This practice was predicated on the need to allow the banks cater
for the interest of their customers in their branches nationwide. After the
allocations had been taken up. each bank's account with the Central Bank was
debited with the naira equivalent of the allocations. For this purpose. the CBN
selling rate which was usually 0.5 per cent above the market rate was applied.
Dealers were not allowed to use funds so acquired for inter-bank transactions or
for parallel market operations. Thus. all banks that came to the market were
allotted their share of total allocations.
The dealing banks submitted bids on their own account, on a daily basis. to the
Central Bank. The individual bids, which were not to exceed the maximum which
each bank was entitled to, were arranged in descending order of bid rates. The bid
rate of the bank that cleared the market represented the cut-off point. Though the
bid rates influenced the determination of CBN's "effective" rates. the criteria for
determining the nalra exchange rate were not unique. However, once the rate was
determined. the CBN selling rate was regarded as a base rate by the banks.
Burec.ux De Change

One important policy action taken in 1989 was the licensing and commencement of operation by bureaux-de-change in the economy. These are institutions
specifically licensed to undertake foreign exchange transactions on a relatively
small scale. Their operations are aimed at enhancing macro-economic management, through broadening the scope of legitimate foreign exchange transactions,
improving fiscal efficiency, provision of the free access to foreign exchange to small
users in a convenient and informal manner. thereby filling gaps under the existing
arrangements. Although not in the instrument setting them up, the bureaux-dechange could also provide competition to the parallel or unofficial market and
possibly marginalize it.
Re-Introduction of the Dutch Auction System

On December 14, 1990, the Dutch Auction System (DAS) was re-introduced to
check, it was hoped, the observed deficiencies in the market. These deficiencies
included foreign exchange hoarding, submission of multiple bids thus inflating the
demand for foreign exchange. Under the DAS, however, banks had to pay for
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foreign exchange allocations at their bid rates. Also, the accounts of the successful
bidders with the Central Bank were'to be debited automatically with the naira
equivalent of the bank's dollar allocations. Consequently, the onus rested on each
bank to adequately fund its account before coming to the market. Banks which
ignored these guidelines were to be automatically barred from participating in the
market for a certain period of time. Persistent underfunding of accounts would
lead to permanent exclusion from the market.
With the re-introduction of the DAS, banks were regrouped into six categories
with percentage allocations ranging from 4. 70 for the first category to 0.45 for the
last. Four factors were considered in categorising the banks. These included
shareholders funds, deposit base, loans and advances and profit before tax. The
shareholders funds were adjusted to take account of operating losses where
applicable, while loans and advances were computed net of provisions for nonperforming assets. Different weights were assigned to these indices.
The marginal rate continued to be used to det~rmine the official rate. This was
the rate that exhausted supply. This rate was marked up by 1% to determine the
effective rate. The CBN buying and selling rates were accordingly determined by
adding and subtracting 0.5 per cent. The banks determine their rates through
their individiual bid rates subject to a margin of 0. 5 per cent on either side of their
bid rates.
Jumbo Sales

On 22/3/91, the CBN decided to further mop up excess liquidity and assuage
the high demand for foreign exchange by making available to the banks an
unusually large amount of funds totalling $197 .3 million. The banks (107) took up
$174. 7 million. All were successful. The amount supplied by the CBN equalled the
amount demanded by the banks. On 27 /3/91, another jumbo sale of$120 million
was made compared with $177.4 million demanded by the banks. The sum of
$107 .8 million was taken up and only 54 banks were successful. The rate of failure
increased this time because many banks which did not adequately fund their
accounts were disqualified. These measures caused the naira to temporarily
appreciate in the official market.

Modified Dutch Aution System (MDAS)

Despite the re-introduction of the DAS in December 1990, the depreciation of
the naira exchange rate persisted although there were flashes of strength especially in March and April 1991, when excess liquidity mopping-up operation was
stepped up through the issuance of relatively large volumes of stabilization
securities. By the mid-August, it was clear that unless urgent measures were
taken, the sharp depreciation of the naira exchange rate might vitiate the other
objectives of policy. Therefore to further mop-up excess liquidity in the economy,
deal with the problem of multiple applications from bidders and reduce speculative
fever, the Dutch Auction system was modified with effect from August 14, 1991.
Under the new system, banks were no longer required to bid on their own behalf
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but on behalf of their customers. Banks were required to debit the accounts of
their customers immediately with the naira value equivalent of their foreign
exchange requests at the time the request was made. Furthermore, the bid rate of
each bank was weighted by its demand for foreign exchange and aggregated to
arrive at a weighted average for all the banks. The CBN marks up the weighted
average by one per cent to arrive at the effective rate or central rate from which the
buying and selling rate are determined. Nevertheless, the banks continued to be
debited at their bid rates plus one per cent mark-up. Under the new system
success at the auction depends on how far an individual bank's bid rate deviates
from the weighted average. Other things equal, the smaller the deviation, the better
the chances of a bank succeeding. The above policy measures were taken to raise
the efficiency rate of the foreign exchange market through their direct effects on
the naira exchange rate itself.
· Complementary measures

Complementary measures were also taken to realign the demand and supply of
foreign exchange at desired levels. Aggregate demand management policies
involved restraint on monetary expansions and on government deficit financing.
In the area of monetary policy, the prescribed ceiling on credit expansion was
reduced in January 1989, while banks' cash reserve requirements and the
Mini.mum Rediscount Rate (MRR) were revised upwards. In April 1989, monetary
policy became ~ore restrictive when the cash reserve requirements and the
statutory liquidity ratio were further raised. In addiUon, banks and non-bank
financial institutions that grant credit in Nigeria were prohibited from granting
loans denominated in naira on the guarantee of foreign assets. Institutions that
failed to comply were made to deposit with the CBN an amount equivalent to the
loan principal so granted. In the area of fiscal policy, the Federal Government,
directed, in June, that all Federal and State governments' deposits and those of
their agencies be transferred from the commercial banks to the CBN. Deposits so
transferred totalled H8.5 billion at the end of July 1989. From August, excess
liquidity in the system was further mopped up through the issuance of stabilization
securities which are compulsorily taken up by banks deemed to be characterised
by excess liquidity.
On the supply side, government continued to provide incentives designed to
increase non-oil export receipts and diversify the export base. The incentives
include the right of exporters (including exporters of petroleum products) to retain
100 per cent of their proceeds in their domiciliary accounts and use them for
legitimate transactions, the Rediscounting and Refinancing Facility (RRF) established bytheCentralBankin 1987; and the Nigerian Export Credit Guarantee and
Insurance Corporation (NECGIC). Debt management policies have also been
supportive of exchange rate policy. Through rescheduling, restructuring and debt
conversion, the foreign debt is being effectively managed while new funds are being
sourced at concessionary rates to fund the foreign exchange market and boost the
country's productive capacity.
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SECTION III
APPRAISAL OF RECENf EXCHANGE RA'IE POLICY MEASURES

For a fair assessment ofthe naira exchange rate policy pursued since 1986, both
the achievements and the lingering problems will be analysed in relation to the
objectives set out earlier at some point in the paper. Some of these objectives
include the elimination of overvaluation of the exchange rate, reduction of the
parallel market premium and elimination of payments arrears.
However, in assessing the impact of exchange rate on the economy. it is
necessary at the outset to note some caveats. First, no empirical tests have been
conducted to isolate the effect of exchange rate changes from those arising from
other policies, especially monetary, fiscal and sectoral policies. For example, an
increase in real output may be due to increase in agricultural production arising
from better incentives to agricultural producers, good weather or the opening up
of rural areas. Second, the exchange rate itself could also be affected by those
aggregates which it is hypothesized to influence. This is the so-called simultaneous
equation bias. For example, it has been observed that the depreciation of the naira
exchange rate increases the production costs of producers which may in turn lead
to increase in prices. However, price increases lead to inflationary expectations
which may in turn cause the depreciation of the rate itself. Third. the attainment
of one objective of policy may vitiate the realization of another objective. For
example, high level employment may be achieved through demand management
policy that puts pressure on prices. This would lead to the depreciation of the
exchange rate. Thus a careful assessment of the trade-offs among policy objectives
is required. As a result of these problems, only impressionistic ·or qualitative
statement can be made about the effect of exchange rate on some of the targets of
policy.
To ease the process of appraising the current exchange rate policy, a comparative approach has been adopted. Accordingly. movements in policy targets during
the current period ofindependent floating (1986-'-1990) are compared with those
aggregates in the preceding five years (1981-1985). A country's currency is said
to be floating independently if the exchange rate is market determined, with or
without government intervention. With the aforementioned caveats in mind, an
examination of the policy targets during the periods under consideration indicates
that exchange rate has had generally positive impact on the economy. Real output,
which declined by an average of 4 per cent during the 1981-1985 period rose by
4.8 per cent in 1986-1990. The tum-around reflected impressive performances
by the industrial and agricultural sectors whose output increased by 9. 5 and 6.1
per cent In the 1986-1990 period compared to an average decline of2.8 per cent
and an increase of only 1.2 per cent in the preceding five years, respectively. The
current account balance as a percentage of GDP. recorded an average deficit of 5.6
per cent in 1981-1986 contrasting with an average surplus of 3.4 per cent in
1986-1990. This reflected the drop in the volume of imports and the higher
relative contribution of non-oil exports to total exports. The contribution of nonoil exports to total exports averaged 6.0 per cent during 1986-1990 indicating an
average increase of2.8 percentage points over the level in the preceding five years.
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Along with trade and payments liberalization, the exchange rate policy has
succeeded in eliminating the incidence of payments arrears which had tended to
compromise the country's creditworthiness in the past. The liquidation of payments arrears was however expected, given the cash and carry nature of the
current payments system. Following the Incentive given to exporters to retain
wholly the proceeds from their exports, the proportion of repatriated earnings ·to
total value of non-oil exports increased steadily from 73.7 per cent in 1987 to 98.5
per cent In 1990. Diversification of non-oil exports has also proceeded smoothly
with the exportation of hitherto relatively unknown exports such as Peogeut cars,
asbestos cement, charcoal and empty bottles. Most remarkable has been the
narrowing of the average parallel market premium from 160.6 per cent in the
period 1981-1985 to 54. 3 per cent in 1986-1990. This was a clear indication of
the extent to which the misalignment of the naira exchange rate and distortions
in foreign exchange transaction has been corrected. Despite the above achievements, many grey areas remain.
Capacity utilization in the industrial sector remained low, ,falling from an
average of 47 per cent in 1981-1985 to 40 per cent in 1986-1990. The decline
reflected not only high cost of imported inputs induced by the low value of the naira
but also high cost of credit following the deregulation of interest rate. The level of
external reserves, although rising in recent years, had remained comparatively
low. Reserves could cover 2.3 months ofimports in 1981-1985 compared with 5.9
months in 1986-1990. Reserves averaged $1,887.8 million in 1981-1985
compared with $1.691.3 million in 1986-1990. However, the relatively low level
ofreserves under the current exchange rate regime is not unexpected given the fact
that the more flexible an exchange rate regime, the lower the need for reserves
since pressure on reserves caused by excess demand for foreign exchange is
reduced as a result of the depreciation of the exchange rate. Other problem areas
are the instability of the naira exchange rate and the large parallel market
premium. These are discussed below in greater detail.
Stability of the Naira Exchange Rate

Developments in the Foreign Exchange market do not indicate that the stability
objective has been achieved. Despite the numerous changes introduced since
1986, the naira exchange rate continued to depreciate and had become more
unstable than in the preceding five years. Deviation from overall mean averaged
N 2,430.5 = $1 in 1981 to 3rd quarter 1986 compared with N-2.8746 = $1 from 4th
quarter 1986 to third quarter 1991. This-result is graphically presented in Chart
1. Chart 2 also indicates that the naira exchange rate was relatively stable from
first quarter 1987 to first quarter 1988 with instability increasing from then on to
second quarter of 1989. This was followed by a period of relative stability between
second quarter of 1989 to third quarter of 1990. Since then instability increased.
Thus the introduction of FEM, DAS and the implementation of the various
complementary monetary and fiscal measures have not stemmed the pressure on
the exchange rate. The naira exchange rate, for example, depreciated by 46 per
ce~t from $1 = N-3.9691 in 1988 to $1 = N7.3651, on the average, in 1989.
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Since the re-introduction of the Dutch Auction System (DAS) on December 14,
1990, the Naira has weakened markedly. At the end of December 1990 one US
dollar traded forN9.0001 in the official market, indicating a depreciation of 6. 7 per
cent when compared With the rate prevailing on the eve of the introduction of the
DAS. Prior to that date, the naira exchange rate had shown a tendency to
appreciate in the official market.
In the Bureaux de Change and the parallel market, the naira exchange rate
remained relatively stable in December, 1990. Since then, however, the rate has
depreciated substantially and persistently in all the markets. In the official
market. the naira exchange rate depreciated by 5.5 per cent in January 1991.
Available data during the first five months _of 1991 Indicated a depreciation of 13. 6
per cent. The weakening of the naira exchange rate was equally dramatic in the
bureaux de change where the rate weakened by 7.2 and 7.6 per cent in January
and February. respectively. In April, the rate averaged $1 = Nl2.37 indicating a
further depreciation of9.2 per cent from the rate prevailing at the beginning of the
year. In the parallel market, one dollar traded for Nl2.37 in April, indicating a
depreciation of 9.2 per cent from the operative rate at the beginning of the year.
Rates lh the official, bureaux de change and parallel markets indicated
depreciations of7.6, 21.9 and 22.5 per cent in April 1991 respectively. However,
folloWing a liquidity mop-up operation conducted in March 1991. the naira
appreciated in March and April in the official market while the rate of depreciation
in the other two markets declined in March. However, in line with similar
behaviour in the past, the depreciation of the naira exchange rate resumed in May
in the official market while the rate of depreciation accelerated further in the other
two markets in April.
Parallel market premium

The parallel market premium which averaged 160.6 per cent in the period
1981-1985, declined to 54.3 per cent in 1986-1990 indicating that the misalignment of the exchange rate had been comparatively reduced. Analysis based
on annual movements showed that following tough monetary and fiscal measures
taken in 1990 the premium narrowed substantially from 42. 7 per cent in 1989 to
19.6 percentin 1990. It declined to alowofl5.9 percentin March and April 1990.
In 1991 the premium widened progressively from 17.9 percent in January to 39.5
per cent in April. However. it declined steadily to 26.9 per cent in August 1991
following the relatively large depreciation of the official rate. Following the
modification of the DAS. the official rate appreciated by 10.6 per cent in September
1991 compared with only 2.1 per cent appreciation of the parallel rate. Consequently, the arbitrage premium widened again from 26. 9 per cent in Augu$t to 37. 5
per cent in September. 1991.
The persistently large parallel marked premium clearly indicates the continued
misalignment of the naira exchange rate. The disequilibrium may be due to
fundamental and structural factors such as the persistently large excess demand,
and entrenched interests.
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SECTION IV
MEASURES TO ENSURE A VIABLE AND STABLE NAIRA EXCHANGE RATE

Available data indicate that the oveivaluation of the naira exchange rate which
characterized the erstwhile rigid exchange rate regime has been largely eliminated.
The oveivaluatlon of the naira exchange rate measured against the PPP equilibrium was about 200 per cent in the pre-SAP period and was eliminated by 1987.
Also, the parallel premium which was over 300 per cent in 1985 has been
drastically reduced. However, In recent months, the naira exchange rate has
tended to veer from the equilibrium. As noted earlier, the real exchange rate is a
function of many variables notably, the relative inflation and interest rates
between Nigeria and her trading partners as well as the incidence of speculation,
among others. Consequently, stability of the exchange rate requires that these
variables themselves should be as stable as possible. The viability and stability of
the naira exchange rate in future therefore requires a consideration of the future
stability of those variables that influence the rate. However, to ensure that the.
factors that determine the rate achieve their desired objective, it is necessary that
the factors themselves should move freely to reflect changes in economic fundamentals. Therefore, I wish to assume that economic policy will continue to be
formulated within the framework of a liberalized and deregulated economic
environment, where economic agents are free to respond to free market signals. It
should however be noted that it might be expedient as a matter of deliberate policy
to allow the exchange rate to diverge from equilibrium. In this regard, the exchange
rate of a currency could remain undervalued if policy is to encourage exports, given
the right conditions. Some newly industrialized countries ofAsia pursued that line
of policy to encourage their manufacturing sectors to produce for exports.
The rest of this section will review areas that policy should be directed to ensure
the future viability and stability of the naira exchange rate. This does not imply
that the present policies are not right. Indeed without these policies, the situation
would have been worse. The assertion here, therefore, is that since the naira
exchange rate is still unstable, there is need to intensify action to push it towards
equilibrium. The future stability of the naira exchange rate will depend on efforts
to reduce the pressure on the general level of prices, reduce the huge fiscal deficit,
harmonize fiscal and monetary policy and reduce the excess demand for foreign
exchange.
Fiscal Deflcit and the Naira Exchange Rate

In recent years, the level of fiscal deficit has been increasing. It rose from N-12.2
billion in 1988 to N-15.3 billion in 1989 and jumped toN-17.0 billion in 1990. As
a proportion of GDP, it fellslightlyfrom8.5 percent in 1988 to 7.9in 1989 but rose
to 8.8 per cent in 1990. Prelimihary data for the first half of 1991 indicated a deficit
ofN-19.5 billion representing 12.4 per cent of projected GDP. Studies carried out
in the Research Department indicate that the exchange rate is strongly influenced
by the method of financing the deficit. Normally, deficits are financed by one or a
combination of the following sources viz drawings on external debt, borrowing
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from the banking system and drawdown on other funds. Financing the deficit
through drawdown on external loans causes the exchange rate to appreciate
through the inflow of foreign exchange. However. deficits financed through the
banking system especially through the Central Bank, directly increase liquidity
which, other things equal, exerts pressure on the exchange rate. Analysis carried
out recently show that a 10 per cent increase in government deficit causes the
natra to depreciate by a magnitude ranging from 1.2 to 2.4 per cent. Thus, with the
deficit increasing by 52.9 per cent in 1990 from the level at the end of 1988, the
natra exchange rate would be expected to depreciate by between 6.35 and 12. 7 per
cent in 1990. In other words, the nominal exchange rate would, other things equal.
lie betweenN8.1061 and N8.5901 to the dollar in 1990. The observed rate in 1990
was N8. 7071 to the dollar in December, l '990, which is close to the predicted value.
The deficit in the first half of 1991 averaged N3,260.4 million indicating an increase of 67.5 per cent over the average monthly deficit ofN 1,946.4 million in first
half of 1990. Consequently, the exchange rate would be expected to lie between
N9Al24 and Nl0.1177 to the dollar in June 1991. The observed rate stood at
Nl0.1722 to the US dollar in June, 1991 which was not far from predicted value.
What the above analysis has conclusively demonstrated is that any action to
stabilize the naira exchange rate must start with the reduction of fiscal deficit.
InjlatiDn and Natra Exchange Rate

The equilibrium exchange rate ts also influenced by changes in relative inflation
1,ltes between Nigeria and her trading partners. Consequently, factors that put
pressure on prices directly influence the exchange rate. Factors that cause prices
to rise may be analysed from two angles - inadequate supply of and high level of
demand for goods and services. Supply shortages can be remedied through
imports and increased domestic output. Domestic demand is strongly influenced
by the amount of liquidity in the economy. To stabilize prices therefore required
a two-pronged attack - increasing supply to satisfy a given level of demand or
reducing demand to match available supply. Increase in supply through imports
has been contratned by shortage of foreign exchange for domestic use. Efforts
should therefore be intensified to reschedule the country's external debt so as to
make more resources available for domestic use. In addition, there is need for the
country to pursue a more aggressive export policy which will seek to expand nonoil exports. In this regard, the execution of Liquifled Natural Gas (LNG), the
petrochemical and Oso-condensate projects should be pursued to its logical
conclusion. On the need to restrain demand, the huge fiscal deficit comes to mind
again. This is because increase in the level of deficit increases liquidity in the
system. Therefore, with given supply of goods and services such an increase in
liquidity is expressed in high demand for goods and services which exerts pressure
on prices. Although prices ~_!"Opped early in 1991, the upward trend has resumed
since May. This has occurred despite the tight posture of monetary policy. Since
August 1990, the Central Bank has taken concerted action to mop up excess
liquidity generated by large government deficit. There is need therefore to ensure
the harmonization of monetary and flscatpolicies.
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Speculation

Speculation can either be stabilizing or destabilizing. In a situation of stabilizing
speculation, speculators buy (sell) foreign exchange now because they expect the
price of the currency to rise (fall) In future. In so doing, they cause the present
prices to rise (fall) beyond what It would normally be. -When however, their
expectations are realized they sell (buy) and cause the price to fall (rise) thereby
evening out the degree of fluctuations. This promotes stability of the exchange
rate. In a situation of destabilizing speculation, the speculator buys, for example,
not with the hope of selling in the near future when prices rise but to hoard, with
the expectation that the price will continue to rise. This action further constrains
the availability of foreign exchange and with Increased speculative buying, causes
the exchange rate to depreciate further thereby pulling the exchange rate further
away from its equilibrium rate. Speculative behaviour is largely influenced by
considerations about how well the economy is managed, consistency about
government policy and expectations and judgment about the certainty ofavailability
of foreign exchange in the future.
In Nigeria, speculation has been largely destabilizing reflecting the endemic
shortage of foreign exchange. This has been manifested in the persistent depreciation of the naira exchange rate. Sl)eculative fever will lessen only when more
foreign exchange is made available to the official mark.et and to the parallel market
through inflow of autonomous funds. Monetacy and fiscal policy actions which
mop up excess liquidity in the system will also reduce the speculator's ability to
speculate. Therefore, current effort to drain off excess liquidity from the system
should continue.
Interest Rate Policy

Available data show that the parallel mark.et premium was smaller in 1990
(averaging 19.6) when the interest rate was more deregulated than during the first
nine months of 1991 (monthly average of29.4 per cent) when It was capped. This
was due In part to the higher cost ofborrowtng In the former period. It may be noted
that the parallel mark.et premium rose persistently from Januacy to April 1991 but
fell continuously from May to August largely as a result of excess liquidity mopping
up operations conducted by the CBN through the issuance ofstabilizing securities.
To ensure that the naira exchange stabilizes and even appreciate, there is need to
uncap the interest rate. This will help to mobilize savings, reduce speculative fever
and narrow the Interest rate differential between Nigeria and the rest of the world.
Eventually, the rate of interest will decline and had indeed started to do so in 1990.
For example, the rates for call money and 7-day deposits fell from 29.3 and 28.2.
per cent in Januacy 1990 to 23.6 and 19.4 per cent In November, respectively.
Increasing Supply of .Foreign Exchange
A critical problem hindering the achievement of a stable naira exchange rate is
the serious shortage of foreign exchange from both official and non-official
sources. Inflow from official sources has been largely constrained by large external
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debt service payments which gulped about 38.0 per cent of official foreign
exchange inflow during the first nine months of 1991. Non-official inflow has been
comparatively low, averaging about $1,217.5 billion in the last three years
compared with private sector foreign exchange demand of $12.4 billion. On the
official side, there is need to increase the amount of foreign exchange put in FEM
by urgently concluding the debt rescheduling arrangements with Nigerta's external creditors. This will allow the funding of the official segment of the FEM to
increase beyond the present $57.5 million weekly allocation. The potentials of the
Oso-condensate, petrochemical and LNG projects should be fully explored. On the
non-official side, the prtvate sector should endeavour to increase autonomous
inflow to the point where government would withdraw from funding the FEM. The
prtvate sector should therefore imbibe the spirtt of "export or perish" and
rededicate itself to the task of completely meeting its own demand for foreign
exchange.
SEC11ONV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
At the end of 1985, the Nigertan economy was in a highly distressed state.
Following the plummenting of oil prtces early in the decade, foreign exchange
inflow fell to precartously low level. This had adverse effects on the economy.
External reserves dwindled. Payments arrears mounted as international commitments could not be scaled down immediately in line with the new realities.
International confidence in the economy was seriously eroded. Real output
declined while the level of unemployment increased. Agrtcultural output and
industrtal production also nosedived. While these problems persisted, the naira
exchange rate remained overvalued thereby accentuating the distortions in the
economy. The parallel market in foreign exchange and goods blossomed as prtces
of exports paid to domestic producers became uncompetitive. The SAP was
therefore instituted in 1986 to tum the economy around by tackling the problems
of structural rigidities in the economy. Generally, SAP was to usher in a new style
in economy management predicated on the interplay of market forces. In particular, SAP sought to foster balance of payments viability, reduce the dependence of
the economy on imports and the oil sector and increase efficiency in resource
allocation by ensuring that the naira exchange rate was realistically determined
through an institutional framework the "Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market"
(SFEM). Since the introduction of SFEM in 1986, the naira exchange rate has
depreciated to the consternation of the authorities and the users of foreign
exchange generally. To enhance its effectiveness the SFEM has been continually
fine-tuned.
To ease the process of appraising the exchange rate changes, certain fundamental concepts in exchange rate determination were explained in section one. These
included the concepts of nominal and real exchange rate, the nominal and real
effective exchange rate and equilibrium of the exchange rate. In addition, the
objectives of exchange rate policy were analyzed. Speciflcally, policy was aimed at
diversifying the export base, reducing imports so as to increase the development
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of local substitutes, correcting the overvaluation of the nal.ra exchange rate,
reducing or eliminating payments arrears etc. The paper has stressed the
importance of stability of the naira exchange rate and noted that stability does not
imply fixity but that the rate should be allowed to vary in a manner that should
foster the achievement of other macro-economic objectives. The need to also
reduce the parallel market premium to some manageable level was emphasized
because its continued existence clearly indicates misalignment of exchange rate
and inefficiency in resource allocation. The paper has also reviewed the various
policy changes made since 1986. These include the pricing and allocative formulae
applied in making foreign exchange available to banks and others authorized to
buy foreign exchange at the auctions. The paper noted the use of simple average
and marginal pricing methods, the merger of the first and second-tier foreign
exchange markets, the introduction of the Dutch Auction system, the interbank
foreign exchange market, the introduction of bureaux de change, the re-introduction of the DAS and its recent modification in August 1991. Generally, these finetuning operations were carried out to improve the efficiency of the foreign exchange
market and were aimed at the achievement of a realistic naira exchange rate.
The impact of the new exchange rate policy on the economy had mixed results.
Comparing the period 1981-1985 and 1986-1990 it was indicated that aggregate output, industrial output and .agricultural production grew faster in 19861990 than in the preceding five years. Payments arrears were eliminated and
although the parallel market premium persisted in 1986-1990, it declined
compared to 1981-1985. The current account was also relatively more buoyant
in 1986-1990. However, instability of the rate increased, the parallel market
premium persisted and has tended to widen in recent months. The paper
concludes by suggesting the measures needed to stabilize the naira exchange rate
such as the deregulation of the interest rate, resolution of the external debt
problem and increase non-oil official export receipts so as to increase funding of
FEM. The private sector is urged to pursue a more aggressive export policy so as
to meet its demand for foreign exchange and reduce pressure on the FEM.
Overall, the impact of the new exchange rate policy on the economy has been
salutary. However, certain problems persist which frustrate the realization of the
policy objective. In particular, there is need to reduce the level of fiscal deficit.
Other measures include, the harmonization of monetary and fiscal policies, the
uncapping of interest rate, increase in non-oil export receipts and further.
restructuring of the external debt service payments. Finally, the private sector was
called upon to pursue a more aggressive export policy so as to earn foreign
exchange to finance its operations without undue pressure on officially generated
resources.
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Table 1
PARALLEL MARKET PREMIUM
Official f!!}
$
Rate

Period

Bureaux

de change

0.7642
0.8924
1.756
4.016
4.5367
7.3919

-

'fl

Parallel (NJ
market

$

Parallel
market Premium

10.13

3.25
3.79
4.17
5.55
6.05
10.545

325.3
324.7
137.5
38.2
33.3
42.7

7.8620
9.9001
7.9388
7.9400
7.9400
7.9424
7.9523
7.9623
7.9743
8.0089
8.3247
8.7071
8.0378

9.51
9.49
9.26
9.27
9.30
9.47
9.88
9.67
9.78
9.91
10.15
10.10
9.65

9.50
9.41
9.20
9.20
9.26
9.44
9.79
9.62
9.72
9.85
10.10
10.20
9.61

20.8
19.1
15.9
15.9
16.6
18.9
23.l
20.8
21.9
23.0
21.3
17. l
19.6

June
July
Aug.
sept.

9.2121
9.6108
9.4521
8.8691
9.3700
10.1722
11.0474
11.3280
10.2416

10.82
11.80
11.99
12.37
12.64
13.21
14.19
14.37
14.00

10.86
11.82
11.99
12.37
12.64
13.18
14.15
14.37
14.08

17.9
23.0
26.9
39.5
34.9
, 29.6
28. l
26.9
37.5

Sources

(a)

World Currency Year book for parallel market rates

(b)

1984- 1987.
Compiled from data available in C.B.N.

1984
1985
1986
1887
1988
1989

1990
Jan.
Feb.
March
April
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Average

1991
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
April
May

-

TABLE2
FEM BID RATES

Year/Month

Highest Bid Rate
H
$-

1987
1988
1989

Lowest Bid
Rate H
$

Ratio of
L/ Highest Rate
%

Anwunt
Demanded
($ M)

Anwunt
Received
($ MJ

Difference
($ M)

4.2889
4.5702
7.4900

3.8960
4.4699
6.8869

90.8
97.8
91.9

2,785.0
3,259.6
17,411.5

2,330.4
2,879.0
2,278.2

-454.6
-380.6
-15,133.3

7.8723
7.9088
7.9488
7.9505
7.9735
8.0025
8.0053
8.0250
8.0716
8.1498
8.3876
8.8469
8.0952

7.4104
7.5246
7.6785
7.8209
7.8591
7.8031
7.9108
7.8415
7.9366
7.5369
7.9355
8.2954
7.7961

94.1
95.1
96.6
98.4
98.5
97.5
98.8
97.7
98.3
92.5
94.6
93.8
96.3

1,822.1
1,534.5
1,566.7
1,016.6
1,348.1
1,435.5
1,492.6
1,784.0
1,569.6
2,113.8
2,325.5
2,169.1
1,681.5

262.1
238.5
223.5
155.0
199.5
199.1
189.1
222.4
183.1
239.0
251.6
218.0
215.1

-1,560
-1,259.9
-1,343.2
- 861.6
-1, 148.6
-1,236.5
-1,303.5
-1,561.6
-1,386.5
-1,874.8
-2,073.9
-1,951.1
-1,466.4

9.3477
9.6620
10.2656
10.1052
9.6643
10.5156
11.5751
11.6200

9.0941
9.4904
9.0597
8.7302
9.1480
9.9956
10.9225
11.0509

97.3
98.2
88.3
86.4
94.7
95.1
95.1
95.1

934.8
824.8
840.1
593.6
625.1
796.9
1,012.8
651.2

264.5
230.0
292.5
219.2
238.3
212.7
276.8
218.7

-

1990

Jan.
Feb.
March
April
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Average
1991

Jan.
Feb.
March
April
May
June
July
Aug.
Source:

Compiled from C.B.N. sources.

-

-

670.3
594.8
547.6
374.4
386.8
584.2
736.0
432.5

TABLE 3
FOREIGN EXCHANGE FLOWS, DOMESTIC LIQUIDI1Y AND TiiE NAJRA EXCHANGE RATE
Foreign E:xrhange lriflow
{US $ MUlion)

OU

Non-OU

Total
(1/+/2/

Debt
Serulce

PeriDd

(1)

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1st Oct.
2nd Oct.
1

•

/2)

/3)

22,932.6 3,046.7
17,471.5 .3,977,7
12,178.5 2,772.7
10,192,5 1,486.7
11,016.1
1,105.3
11,367.2
943.0
5,742.5
1,461.8
4,924.3
1,934.4
4,924.9
1,549.2
5,913.2
2,224.0
7,437.1
2,998.3

25,979.3
21,449.2
14,951.2
11,679.2
12,121.4
12,310.2
7,204.1
6,593.7
6,474.1
8,137.2
10,435.4

973.6 1
620.9 1

1,111.6
782.5

137.81
165.9 1

Monetary Aggregate ((End of
PeriDd IN MUUon))

Foreign Exchange
Disbursement
{US$ Million/

/4)

Net
AuaUable
To Serulce
11,e Economy
/3)-(4)
/5)

Narrow
Money
M,

/6)

Tune and
Sauings
Deposit
{QM)
(7)

Broad
Money
M,

Naira/US
Dollar
Exchange
Rate
End of
PeriDd
IN= $1 I

Units of
Domestic
Lquldtty
To A Urutof
AuaUable
Dollar
[NJ

/6/+{7)
/8)

(9/

/10)

185.8
857.4
1,151.6
1,845.5
3,455.1
4,180.4
2,127.2
1,567.0
1,959.3
2,035.8
3,823.8

25,793.5
20,591.8
13,799.6
9,833.7
8,666.3
8,129.8
5,076.9
5,026.7
4,514.8
6,101.4
6,611.6

9,226.8
9,774.9
10,048.9
11,282.4
12,204.1
8,129.8
12,728.3
14,905.9
20,052.7
25,697.6
37,233.7

5,170.6
5,803.2
6,845.4
8,086.5
9,396.4
10,550.8
11,487.7
15,088.7
18,397.2
20,525.3
27,669.0

14,397.4
15,548.1
16,893.9
19,368.9
21,600.5
23,818.6
24,216.0
29,994.6
38,449.9
46,222.9
64,902.7

0.5444
0.6369
0.6702
0.7485
0.8082
0.9996
3.1166
4.4104
5.3530
7.6500
9.0001

0.56
0.76
1.22
1.97
2.49
2.93
4.77
5.97
8.52
7.5758
9.8165

324.3
373.9

787.3
412.9

3,093.7'
3,447.2 2

2,418.0
2,653.72

5,511.82
6,100.92

9.3138
9.7629

7.0009
14.7757

Monthly Average
Monthly Average holdings of stock
Source:
Complied from data available In C.B.N.

TABLE 4
OVERVALUATION/UNDERVALUATION OF NAIRA EXCHANGE

Domestic
Price level
pd

Trading
Partner's
Price level

Absolute
PPP
pd/pf

Official
Exchange
Rate

Equilibrium
Exchange'
Rate

$/H (Ex)

1960
"1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1• 1991
June

Measure of
Overvaluation/
undervaluation
(~) I

-

100.0
1,494.3
1,574.7
1,735.4
2,399.4
3,381,0
3,634.6

100.0
363.5
370.7
384.l
399.4
418.7
444.2

1.0000
4.1109
4.2479
4.5181
6.00'15
8.0750
8.1823

1.3999
1.1206
0.7806
0.2780
0.2219
0.1354
0.1244

1.3999
0.3405
0.3295
0.3098
0.2330
0.1734
0.1711

229.1
138.7
-1.3
--4.8
-21.9
-27.3

3,849.0

466.4

8.2526

0.1127

0.1696

-33.5

1

Minus sign indicates undervaluation
Plus
"
overvaluation.
• Projected Inflation Rate for Nigeria '91 = 5.9%
• Projected Inflation Rate U.S.A. June 1991 = 5.0%
U.S.A. Inflation as at December 1990 = 6.1%
Nigeria Inflation as at December 1990 = 7.5%
Sources:

(i)
(ii)

Computed from data supplied to C.B.N. by Federal Office of Statistics (FOS)
International Financial Statistics (IFS)

TABLE 5
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS
1984

1985

1989

0.5

9.9

5.2

5.2

10.4

5.3

8.0

6.'I

8.5

-

-8.4

0.5

-4.1

-6.7

-1.5

3.2

4.0

6.6

10.l

5.3

3.7

3.9

!987

1990

1988

1986

G.D.P. (Growth rate)

2.

Fiscal Deficit(% of GDP) ..

3.

Current Account (% of GDP)

..

-4.7

-8.5

-10.3

-5.9

0.1

3.3

-4.5

--0.3

--0.8

4.8

17.7

4.

Capacity Utlllzatlon

..

70.l

73.3

63.6

49. l

42.0

37. l

38.9

40.4

41.5

42.5

37.5

5.

Industrial Production (Growth rate)

-2.8

6.3

-21.6

-4.9

9.1

3.5

18.0

14.5

9.5

2.2

6.

Agne. Production (Growth rate)

3.3

--0.5

-4.4

4.0

3.7

7.7

8.0

-5.9

13.7

7.2

7.

Domestic Prices (Growth rate)

9.9

20.8

7.7

23.2

39.6

5.5

5.4

10.2

38.6

40.9

10.1

8.

Non-Oil Exports as% of Total
Exports

3.7

2.9

2.4

3.9

2.6

3.9

4.1

7.3

9.2

4.9

2.8

10.003.0

3,806.4

1,532.1

1.043.7

1.415.6

1,641.0

1,081.5

1,121.3

611.4

1,758.9

3,883.2

..

External Reserves ($ mllllon)

Source:

\\

1983

1981

l.

9.

\

..

1982

1980

Central Bank of Nigeria

-
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CHART 1

DEVIATION FROM OVERALL MEAN OF
AVE. EXCHANGE RATE (N/$)
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